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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/723,519	11/28/2000	Howard Young	FIS9-2000-0283	6445
30743	7590	10/12/2004	EXAMINER	
WHITHAM, CURTIS & CHRISTOFFERSON, P.C. 11491 SUNSET HILLS ROAD SUITE 340 RESTON, VA 20190			MEINECKE DIAZ, SUSANNA M	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			3623	

DATE MAILED: 10/12/2004

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Advisory Action	Application No.	Applicant(s)
	09/723,519	YOUNG ET AL. <i>W</i>
	Examiner	Art Unit
	Susanna M. Diaz	3623

--The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

THE REPLY FILED 24 September 2004 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR ALLOWANCE. Therefore, further action by the applicant is required to avoid abandonment of this application. A proper reply to a final rejection under 37 CFR 1.113 may only be either: (1) a timely filed amendment which places the application in condition for allowance; (2) a timely filed Notice of Appeal (with appeal fee); or (3) a timely filed Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 CFR 1.114.

PERIOD FOR REPLY [check either a) or b)]

a) The period for reply expires 3 months from the mailing date of the final rejection.
 b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Advisory Action, or (2) the date set forth in the final rejection, whichever is later. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of the final rejection.
 ONLY CHECK THIS BOX WHEN THE FIRST REPLY WAS FILED WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f).

Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.136(a) and the appropriate extension fee have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension and the corresponding amount of the fee. The appropriate extension fee under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened statutory period for reply originally set in the final Office action; or (2) as set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of the final rejection, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

1. A Notice of Appeal was filed on _____. Appellant's Brief must be filed within the period set forth in 37 CFR 1.192(a), or any extension thereof (37 CFR 1.191(d)), to avoid dismissal of the appeal.
2. The proposed amendment(s) will not be entered because:
 - (a) they raise new issues that would require further consideration and/or search (see NOTE below);
 - (b) they raise the issue of new matter (see Note below);
 - (c) they are not deemed to place the application in better form for appeal by materially reducing or simplifying the issues for appeal; and/or
 - (d) they present additional claims without canceling a corresponding number of finally rejected claims.

NOTE: ____.

3. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s): 35 U.S.C. 112, 2nd paragraph rejection of claim 5.
4. Newly proposed or amended claim(s) ____ would be allowable if submitted in a separate, timely filed amendment canceling the non-allowable claim(s).
5. The a) affidavit, b) exhibit, or c) request for reconsideration has been considered but does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: See attached sheet.
6. The affidavit or exhibit will NOT be considered because it is not directed SOLELY to issues which were newly raised by the Examiner in the final rejection.
7. For purposes of Appeal, the proposed amendment(s) a) will not be entered or b) will be entered and an explanation of how the new or amended claims would be rejected is provided below or appended.

The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:

Claim(s) allowed: ____.

Claim(s) objected to: ____.

Claim(s) rejected: 1-7.

Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: ____.

8. The drawing correction filed on ____ is a) approved or b) disapproved by the Examiner.

9. Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449) Paper No(s). ____.

10. Other: ____

Susanna Diaz
SUSANNA M. DIAZ
PRIMARY EXAMINER
A.U.3623

Attachment to Advisory Action (dated October 4, 2004)

Regarding the technological arts requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 101, "Applicants respectfully submit, however, that business management is a useful art and not a liberal art and that there is no independent 'technological arts' rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101." (Page 4 of Applicant's response) The Examiner respectfully disagrees and submits that the phrase "technological arts" has been created and used by the courts to offer another view of the term "useful arts." See *In re Musgrave*, 167 USPQ (BNA) 280 (CCPA 1970). Hence, the first test of whether an invention is eligible for a patent is to determine if the invention is within the "technological arts."

Further, despite the express language of §101, several judicially created exceptions have been established to exclude certain subject matter as being patentable subject matter covered by §101. These exceptions include "laws of nature," "natural phenomena," and "abstract ideas." See *Diamond v. Diehr*, 450, U.S. 175, 185, 209 USPQ (BNA) 1, 7 (1981). However, courts have found that even if an invention incorporates abstract ideas, such as mathematical algorithms, the invention may nevertheless be statutory subject matter if the invention as a whole produces a "useful, concrete and tangible result." See *State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.* 149 F.3d 1368, 1973, 47 USPQ2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998). This addresses the second test under 35 U.S.C § 101 of whether or not an invention is eligible for a patent. The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure reiterates this point. More specifically, MPEP § 2106(II)(A) states, "The claimed invention as a whole must accomplish a practical application. That is, it must produce a 'useful, concrete and

tangible result.' *State Street*, 149 F.3d at 1373, 47 USPQ2d at 1601-02." Furthermore, "Only when the claim is devoid of any limitation to a practical application in the technological arts should it be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101." (MPEP § 2106(II)(A))

This "two prong" test was evident when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) decided an appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). See *In re Toma*, 197 USPQ (BNA) 852 (CCPA 1978). In *Toma*, the court held that the recited mathematical algorithm did not render the claim as a whole non-statutory using the Freeman-Walter-Abele test as applied to *Gottschalk v. Benson*, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ (BNA) 673 (1972). Additionally, the court decided separately on the issue of the "technological arts." The court developed a "technological arts" analysis:

The "technological" or "useful" arts inquiry must focus on whether the claimed subject matter...is statutory, not on whether the product of the claimed subject matter...is statutory, not on whether the prior art which the claimed subject matter purports to replace...is statutory, and not on whether the claimed subject matter is presently perceived to be an improvement over the prior art, e.g., whether it "enhances" the operation of a machine. *In re Toma* at 857.

In *Toma*, the claimed invention was a computer program for translating a source human language (e.g., Russian) into a target human language (e.g., English). The court found that the claimed computer implemented process was within the "technological art" because the claimed invention was an operation being performed by a computer within a computer.

The decision in *State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.* never addressed this prong of the test. In *State Street Bank & Trust Co.*, the court

found that the “mathematical exception” using the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if any, application to determining the presence of statutory subject matter but rather, statutory subject matter should be based on whether the operation produces a “useful, concrete and tangible result.” See *State Street Bank & Trust Co.* at 1374. Furthermore, the court found that there was no “business method exception” since the court decisions that purported to create such exceptions were based on novelty or lack of enablement issues and not on statutory grounds. Therefore, the court held that “[w]hether the patent's claims are too broad to be patentable is not to be judged under §101, but rather under §§102, 103 and 112.” See *State Street Bank & Trust Co.* at 1377. Both of these analyses go towards whether the claimed invention is non-statutory because of the presence of an abstract idea. *State Street* never addressed the first part of the analysis, i.e., the “technological arts” test established in *Toma* because the invention in *State Street* (i.e., a computerized system for determining the year-end income, expense, and capital gain or loss for the portfolio) **was already determined to be within the technological arts** under the *Toma* test. This dichotomy has been recently acknowledged by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in affirming a §101 rejection finding the claimed invention to be non-statutory for failing the technological arts test. See *Ex parte Bowman*, 61 USPQ2d (BNA) 1669 (BdPatApp&Int 2001).

What is indeed important to note in the *Bowman* decision is that the Board acknowledged the dichotomy of the analysis of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, thereby emphasizing the fact that not only must the claimed invention produce a “useful, concrete and tangible result,” **but that it must also be limited to the technological**

arts in order to be deemed statutory under the guidelines of 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Board very explicitly set forth this point:

[1] We agree with the examiner. Appellant has carefully avoided tying the disclosed and claimed invention to any technological art or environment. As noted by the examiner, the disclosed and claimed invention is directed to nothing more than a human making mental computations and manually plotting the results on a paper chart [answer, page 5]. The Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions are not dispositive of this case because there is absolutely no indication on this record that the invention is connected to a computer in any manner.

Despite the express language of 35 U.S.C. §101, several judicially created exceptions have been excluded from subject matter covered by Section 101. These exceptions include laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas. See *Diamond v. Diehr*, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 209 USPQ 1, 7(1981). We interpret the examiner's rejection as finding that the claimed invention before us is nothing more than an abstract idea because it is not tied to any technological art or environment. Appellant's argument is that the physical (even manual) creation of a chart and the plotting of a point on this chart places the invention within the technological arts.

The phrase "technological arts" has been created to offer another view of the term "useful arts." The Constitution of the United States authorizes and empowers the government to issue patents only for inventions which promote the progress [of science and] the useful arts. We find that the invention before us, as disclosed and claimed, does not promote the progress of science and the useful arts, and does not fall within the definition of technological arts. The abstract idea which forms the heart of the invention before us does not become a technological art merely by the recitation in the claim of "transforming physical media into a chart" [sic, drawing or creating a chart] and "physically plotting a point on said chart."

In summary, we find that the invention before us is nothing more than an abstract idea which is not tied to any technological art, environment, or machine, and is not a useful art as contemplated by the Constitution of the United States. The physical aspects of claim 1, which are disclosed

to be nothing more than a human manually drawing a chart and plotting points on this chart, do not automatically bring the claimed invention within the technological arts. For all these reasons just discussed, we sustain the examiner's rejection of the appealed claims under 35 U.S.C. §101. See *Ex parte Bowman*, 61 USPQ2d (BNA) 1669, 1671 (BdPatApp&Int 2001)

Similarly, in the present application, claims 1-7 are deemed to be non-statutory because they are not limited to the technological arts; all recited steps could be performed manually by a human, thereby reinforcing the fact that Applicant's invention fails to "[p]romote the progress of science and useful arts," as intended by the United States Constitution under Art. I, §8, cl. 8 regarding patent protection.

Furthermore, "Applicants traverse on the basis that the claims are inherently means-plus-functions claims and the Specification clearly describes the use of automated data processing means." (Page 5 of Applicant's response) First, although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See *In re Van Geuns*, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993). There are no automated data processing means recited in the claims. Additionally, such means would have to be expressly utilized to perform one of the core steps of the invention (e.g., an analysis or calculation step), as opposed to nominal steps of the invention, in order to overcome the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Second, claims 1-7 are method claims. Method claims are never "inherently means-plus-functions claims." As a matter of fact, Applicants need to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6th paragraph (e.g., utilizing literal "means-plus-function" language in the claims) in order to reap the benefits of inferred limitations associated with "means-plus-function"

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language, as supported by the specification, even in apparatus claims. Applicant presents no apparatus claims; therefore, Applicant's argument is moot.

In conclusion, the Examiner submits that Applicant's claims do not meet the technological arts requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as articulated in *Musgrave*, *Toma*, and *Bowman* as well as the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure.

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